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What in reality corresponds to our concept of 
probability? In his 1921 treatise on the topic, the 
economist John Maynard Keynes o!ered an answer: 
our concept of probability re"ects objective probability 
relations in the world. #ese objective relations 
are something we can directly perceive, according 
to Keynes. #ey are strung between premises and 
conclusions like wires between poles. We may not 
always be able to put a number on them; but we can tell 
that the probability that “We shall reach home alive” 
given that “We are walking home under a clear sky” is 
objectively greater than its probability given that “We 
are walking home in a thunderstorm”. Such objective 
probability relations could be discerned between any 
premises and conclusions, Keynes maintained. 
But his young friend, the precocious genius Frank 
Ramsey, was sceptical. What probability relation, he 
challenged Keynes to tell him, leads from the premise 
that “Napoleon was a great general” to the conclusion 
that “My carpet is blue”? He, for one, did not perceive 
such relations, Ramsey declared, and he suspected that 
others did not perceive them either.
As Ramsey saw it, trying to match up the concept of 
probability with perceivable bits of the world was not 
the way to elucidate it. It was not like the concept 
of rainbow – something best understood by $rst 
studying the nature of rainbows and then explaining 
how we came by the concept of rainbow in terms of 
our repeated encounters with rainbows. #e concept 
of probability was less like an impression left in our 
minds by something already out there, and more 
like a device we had built to navigate the world more 
successfully. Hence, Ramsey proposed to look at the 
function performed by the concept in our thought and 
talk. What work does the concept do for us? What does 
it allow us to achieve that we could not achieve without 
it? We can seek to demystify the concept of probability 
by relating it to human needs rather than to objective 
relations.
If we were all-knowing gods, we would fully believe 
what was true and entirely disbelieve what was false. 
But human minds are mired in uncertainty: there 
are many things that we only partially believe. I may 
be fairly con$dent that this is the path back to the 
campsite, but my con$dence in that belief may wax 







in the sense that they trace concepts to their origins, 
but they are pragmatic genealogies because they are 
primarily concerned with practical origins:% with the 
function that the concept emerged to discharge – and 
perhaps continues to discharge if the needs to which it 
answers have endured.
Unlike intellectual historians, however, pragmatic 
genealogists are not primarily concerned to locate 
the actual historical emergence of a concept; they are 
primarily concerned to determine what makes some of 
our most venerable concepts so indispensable. Indeed, 
if the concept really is indispensable, its historical 
beginnings will anyway be shrouded in the mists 
of the undocumented past. Accordingly, pragmatic 
genealogists often have to imaginatively reconstruct 
the development of a concept. 
Just because the most indispensable concepts are so 
old, however, they are likely to have been shaped by 
a dizzying variety of needs. Where to start? One way 
to bring order into that overwhelming complexity is 
to try and identify some of the most basic functions 
that a concept serves – and these are often far from 
being the most obvious. Much as we tend to be 
oblivious to the way in which the discrete assistance 
of gravity is indispensable to the success even of our 
most banal actions, the work done by our concepts is 
often concealed in that inconspicuous background of 
functionality we take for granted.
Since they want to begin by identifying the most 
fundamental functions performed by a concept, 
pragmatic genealogists initially try to keep local 
peculiarities out of their story. #ey start from a 
rough sketch of a situation that is not localised to any 
particular time or place: a $ctional “State of Nature” or 
some equivalent of it, such as Philip Pettit’s “Erewhon” 
(an anagram of “nowhere” that Pettit adopts from 
Samuel Butler’s novel of the same name). #e idea is 
to construct a model of a maximally generic situation, 
allowing oneself nothing but the practical needs that a 
community of human beings can plausibly be assumed 
to have anyway: the need to $nd food and water, or the 
need to $nd out about the most signi$cant risks in one’s 
immediate environment (where is that bear now?). Of 
course, in imagining what needs human beings would 
have “anyway”, there is a danger of overgeneralising 
from one’s own experience. But there are some needs 
more or less disposed to take the time to go over the 
map again, or to consult the others.
One important function of the concept of probability, 
Ramsey surmised, is to serve as a measure of this 
practical con$dence: it enables us to articulate the 
degrees of belief that underlie our actions. If our 
actions are to meet with success, we had better get our 
degrees of belief right; and this means that we have an 
interest in expressing and comparing our degrees of 
belief, calibrating them against each other. By enabling 
us to think and speak about practical con$dence, the 
concept of probability $lls precisely this need. #is 
helps explain why we have the concept of probability 
and dispel its air of mystery. But instead of explaining 
the concept in terms of what in reality it refers to, we 
shall have explained it in terms of the human concerns 
to which it answers.
***
#ere may be many other concepts that are best 
understood as outgrowths of practical needs rather 
than as after-images of antecedent objects. In fact, 
the lofty abstractions that are most prone to invite 
philosophical puzzlement –%such as truth, knowledge, 
or justice –% are all good candidates. But Ramsey’s 
example is hard to follow. Brilliant "ashes of insight do 
not make a method.
To trace a concept back to the needs it has grown out 
of, one must reverse-engineer the problem to which the 
concept forms a solution. #is requires reconstructing 
the kind of practical situation in which that problem 
would arise, and determining what might drive people 
lacking the concept to invent it. #e task is similar to 
that facing archaeologists who unearth a perplexing 
artefact: they need to imaginatively reconstruct the 
human a!airs that gave rise to and revolved around it 
in order to identify the point of the artefact.
#ere is a philosophical method designed to do just 
that: the method of telling pragmatic genealogies of 
concepts. It is a method that cuts across the analytic-
continental divide, having been employed by David 
Hume as much as by Friedrich Nietzsche. More recently, 
it has been rediscovered notably by philosophers such 
as Edward Craig, Bernard Williams, Miranda Fricker, 
and Philip Pettit. #ese philosophers o!er genealogies 
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that are basic and structural enough to be at work 
nearly everywhere: the need to secure information 
about the risks and opportunities a!orded by the 
environment, for example, would be shared even by 
human communities with radically di!erent outlooks, 
though they might di!er in what they concretely regard 
as a risk or an opportunity.
Given such a state-of-nature model, one can already 
catch a glimpse of the most generic practical pressures 
that might drive the emergence of the concept whose 
function one seeks to reverse-engineer. Just as some 
sculptures start life as a mere armature – a framework 
or formal structure in and around which the clay builds 
up before being moulded and honed into a fully "eshed-
out form – state-of-nature genealogies can help us to 
identify functional armatures underlying concepts and 
their various historical elaborations. Of course, such 
state-of-nature theorising should be informed by and 
checked against the $ndings of anthropology, history, 
and the other human sciences, and even then there 
remains a risk of bending the model to one’s prejudices. 
But the state-of-nature model is not meant to embody 
historical claims about how concepts in fact originated, 
or indeed to yield any $rm answers by itself. Its purpose 
is to prompt us to ask questions we did not know to ask, 
in particular by helping us to see possible connections 
between seemingly idle concepts and practical needs.
***
Once upon a time, Nietzsche wrote, there was a star 
in some remote corner of the universe on which some 
shrewd creatures developed a passion for truth. #ey 
revered it as solemnly as if the world hinged on it. But 
then the creatures died out, and the star froze over, and 
it was as though nothing had happened.
Nietzsche’s fable is meant to bring out how transient, 
volatile, and insigni$cant the human passion for 
truth can seem in the grand scheme of things. But 
it is also meant to dramatise the question of why we 
came to value the truth as we do, as something worth 
seeking and telling even at great cost to ourselves, just 
because it is the truth. Why is that abstract concept so 
important to us? After all, it is not at all obvious why 
human intelligence would have evolved to do anything 
other than to dissimulate, deceive, cheat, and trick. Nor 
have the powerful incentives to be less than truthful 
gone away. #at was the basis of Voltaire’s observation 
that “people employ language only to conceal their 
thoughts”. So why on earth did we come to think of 
truth as valuable for its own sake? And what is the 
value of valuing truth in this way? 
WHY IS TRUTH SO IMPORTANT 
TO US? AFTER ALL, IT IS NOT 
AT ALL OBVIOUS WHY HUMAN 
INTELLIGENCE WOULD HAVE 
EVOLVED TO DO ANYTHING 
OTHER THAN TO DISSIMULATE, 
DECEIVE, CHEAT, AND TRICK
Nietzsche rejected the traditional responses to these 
questions – that the value of truth derived from the 
Platonic Form of Truth, or that human beings valued 
the truth because they valued the “True World” behind 
the apparent one. For Nietzsche, these responses 
missed the respects in which the value of truth was 
all too human. #ey let the world as it was anyway, 
independently of human concerns, do all the explanatory 
work.  #ey maintained, in e!ect, that human minds 
bore the impress of the value of truth because the 
truth was out there and the truth was impressive. #is 
was fundamentally the same explanatory strategy as 
Keynes employed, of elucidating a concept in terms of 
the anterior presence of some object that human beings 
gradually awakened to. 
But Nietzsche preferred to seek the origins of 
mysterious concepts in worldly human a!airs rather 
than in ethereal spheres. In this he was like Ramsey, 
who wrote that his picture of the world was “drawn 
in perspective, and not like a model to scale. #e 
foreground is occupied by human beings and the stars 
are all as small as threepenny bits”. As if responding to 
Nietzsche’s fable, Ramsey added: “In time the world 
will cool and everything will die; but that is a long time 
o! still, and its present value at compound discount 
is almost nothing. Nor is the present less valuable 
because the future will be blank. Humanity, which $lls 
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the foreground of my picture, I $nd interesting and on 
the whole admirable”.
And rather as Ramsey had approached the concept of 
probability by tracing it to the need to measure and 
articulate practical con$dence, Nietzsche thought that 
the value of truth originated in the exigencies of social 
life. In his 1873 essay “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-
Moral Sense” and in his notes from that period, he 
sketched the outlines of a pragmatic genealogy of the 
value of truth. It presents the origins of that exalted 
ideal as thoroughly practical, and commends it for its 
enduring utility as long as it is not pushed too far.
Nietzsche’s genealogy of the value of truth starts 
out from a “State of Nature” from which the value 
of truth is as yet entirely absent: a Hobbesian war of 
all against all, in which the intellect is used mainly 
for dissimulation. But once human beings enter into 
society and language, Nietzsche writes, “the contrast 
between truth and lie $rst comes into being. #e liar 
uses the valid designations, the words, in order to make 
the unreal appear as real: he says, for example, ‘I am 
rich’, when the correct designation of this condition 
would be ‘poor’”. 
On Nietzsche’s view, it is the advent of liars –%Voltaire’s 
people who employ language only to conceal their 
thoughts – that $rst instigates the development of the 
value of truth. In its most primitive form, the value of 
truth consists of two dispositions or character traits: 
the dispositions to seek the truth and the disposition to 
tell the truth. Each of these two dispositions emerges 
in answer to practical needs generated by the advent of 
liars. On the one hand, every individual needs to seek 
the truth in order to avoid the unpleasant consequences 
of being deceived; this encourages the emergence of 
what Nietzsche dubs the “will not to let oneself be 
deceived” – the primitive form of the disposition to 
seek the truth. On the other hand, there is a collective 
need to avoid the unpleasant consequences of rampant 
mendaciousness, which threatens to make it impossible 
for the community to cooperate and communicate 
e!ectively; this encourages society to impose a duty 
to tell the truth and threaten to ostracise those who 
breach that duty. Prudent members of the community 
therefore develop the “will not to deceive” – the 
primitive form of the disposition to tell the truth.
Together, the twin dispositions to seek and tell the 
truth make up the $rst intimations of the value of truth. 
But at this stage in Nietzsche’s genealogy, these are 
merely dispositions to value the truth instrumentally, 
as a means of avoiding the unpleasant consequences of 
being deceived or ostracised for breaching the socially 
imposed duty to tell the truth. Whatever value truth 
has is thus exhausted by the prudential value it derives 
from its consequences. Moreover, the dispositions to 
seek and tell the truth are limited in their application. 
#ere is no expectation that one should seek the truth 
beyond what is instrumentally useful to oneself, or tell 
the truth to people outside one’s community. But in 
this limited form, there is nonetheless value in valuing 
the truth. It answers to the need to avoid deception and 
secure the conditions of cooperation.
As those twin dispositions solidify through habit and 
are inculcated over generations, however, their original 
function is forgotten, and the sense of being socially 
bound to tell the truth awakens a moral impulse in 
connection to truth. #e habits of seeking and telling 
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the truth are imbued with a moral feeling: “our habits 
become virtues”, Nietzsche suggests, because we 
come to think of the behavioural patterns we are in 
the habit of exhibiting as inviolable, and to regard 
the inviolability of those patterns as more important 
than our own welfare. For once imbued with the moral 
feeling of inviolability, the habits of seeking and telling 
the truth are generalised beyond their original domain 
of application: truth comes to be solemnly demanded 
everywhere and towards everyone. #e shrewd 
creatures have developed a passion for truth.
***
Nietzsche’s genealogy of the value of truth began 
as an attempt to understand in what respects it was 
worth having. But he never published these remarks, 
and they were outshone by the $ery rhetoric he later 
directed at in"ated conceptions of truth in the writings 
he did publish. #is choice of emphasis is perhaps not 
surprising given the late nineteenth-century context 
in which he was writing. A witness to the heyday of 
hefty multi-volume scholarly tomes, he seems to have 
felt that his unhealthily truth-obsessed colleagues 
needed no further encouragement. Instead, he warned 
them against the readiness to sacri$ce everything on 
the altar of truth, the attitude of “!at veritas, pereat 
vita!” –% “let there be truth, even should life perish!” 
Truth was a legitimate value, but it had to stand in the 
service of life.
ON NIETZSCHE’S VIEW, IT 
IS THE ADVENT OF LIARS 
THAT FIRST INSTIGATES THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE VALUE 
OF TRUTH
When the English philosopher Bernard Williams 
revived Nietzsche’s genealogical inquiry into the 
point of valuing the truth in his 2002 book Truth and 
Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy, he was writing 
at a very di!erent juncture: between post-modern 
denials of the existence of truth and post-truth 
politics. Accordingly, his emphasis was the opposite of 
Nietzsche’s. Williams sought to highlight the bene$ts 
of valuing the truth, and alert readers to what would be 
lost if we gave up on it.
Where Williams’ genealogy casts a more "attering light 
than Nietzsche’s, in particular, is in showing that there 
is a point not just to valuing the truth, but to valuing 
it for its own sake. Nietzsche had put this down to the 
forces of habit and forgetfulness. But Williams shows 
that there is a powerful practical imperative to do so: 
it is only insofar as the truth is regarded as intrinsically 
valuable that valuing the truth can be instrumentally 
valuable. #e value of truth, it turns out, needs to 
outrun its functionality in order to be functional.
Echoing Nietzsche, Williams begins his genealogy by 
showing how an imaginary community of language-
using human beings in a simpli$ed “State of Nature” 
would be driven to cultivate in its members the 
dispositions to seek and tell the truth. Each individual, 
in order to get by, needs some information about such 
things as whether the bear has come out of hibernation 
yet, or whether the cherries on the other side of the hill 
are ripe. To this end, one can rely on one’s own senses up 
to a point. But trying to $nd out everything for oneself 
is extremely ine&cient, and since not everyone is at the 
same place at the same time, someone else might be able 
to see or hear something that one cannot possibly $nd 
out for oneself. Each individual therefore has a strong 
interest in pooling information with others in a kind 
of division of labour. But if the imaginary community 
is going to pool information, it needs to cultivate in its 
members whatever qualities make good contributors 
to the pool of information. And, according to Williams, 
those qualities are, $rst, the reliable disposition to 
get things right, and second, the reliable disposition 
to pass on that information to others in a way that 
is helpful and not misleading. Williams labels these 
dispositions% “Accuracy” and “Sincerity”, capitalising 
the terms to signal that he is talking about simpler 
prototypes of what we now mean by these terms.
#e trouble, however, is that as long as people are 
Accurate and Sincere only when it suits them anyway, 
any attempt to establish a practice of information 
pooling is doomed eventually to collapse under the 
weight of “free riders”: people who try to pro$t from 
the pool of information without themselves bothering 
to be Accurate or Sincere except when they immediately 
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stand to gain from it. Free riders do not just do little 
to enrich the pool with hard-to-get information; they 
vitiate it with misinformation whenever they can pro$t 
from misleading people. As long as the dispositions of 
Accuracy and Sincerity are valued only instrumentally, 
therefore, the practice of information pooling, however 
valuable, cannot get o! the ground – and everyone is 
worse o! as a result.
#is is why people who pool information need to value 
the truth for its own sake – seeking it out and telling it 
to others just because it is the truth. Once considered 
intrinsically valuable, truth stakes a claim against self-
interest, and the dispositions of Accuracy and Sincerity 
come to be regarded as qualities worthy of emulation 
and praise –%as virtues. #is may not su&ce to override 
self-interest every time. But it enables the practice of 
information pooling to take o!, and the occasional lie 
will not bring it down.
#ere is thus a good practical reason why we are more 
bloody-minded than bene$t-minded about truth. 
#e value of truth is an indispensable instrument 
for information-sharing creatures like us, but it is an 
instrument that can only do its work if its instrumental 
character e!aces itself in favour of less instrumental 
considerations. Like the concept of probability, the 
value of truth is functional for us. But it is functional 
only insofar as we do not understand it merely in 
functional terms. Its functionality, we might say, is 
self-e!acing.
***
Pragmatic genealogies like the genealogies of the value 
of truth told by Nietzsche and Williams can help us 
grasp why we think as we do. But instead of explaining 
concepts by tracing them to antecedent objects in 
reality, they trace them to practical needs and reverse-
engineer the functions performed by the concepts. 
And instead of elucidating concepts with Ramseyan 
"ashes of brilliant insight, they let the light dawn 
gradually, painstakingly reconstructing how certain 
basic needs give rise to further needs, and how these 
in turn generate problems which certain concepts are 
designed to solve.
In so doing, pragmatic genealogies also cast concepts 
in a certain evaluative light. To reveal the function 
of a concept in relation to certain needs is to tell us 
something about how the concept stands to our own 
concerns. It puts us in a position to ask: Do we share 
the needs of the creatures in the genealogical story, or 
has the concept outlived its usefulness? Who exactly 
pro$ts from the work it performs? Should we continue 
to cultivate the concept, and can we adapt or extend 
it so that it can discharge its function even better or 
more widely?
IT IS ONLY INSOFAR AS THE 
TRUTH IS REGARDED AS 
INTRINSICALLY VALUABLE 
THAT VALUING THE TRUTH 
CAN BE INSTRUMENTALLY 
VALUABLE
By enabling us to raise and pursue these questions, 
the backward-looking method of pragmatic genealogy 
feeds into the forward-looking enterprise of revising 
and ameliorating our conceptual repertoire. Especially 
when one lacks a clear sense of what a concept does and 
why one thinks in those terms to begin with, conceptual 
engineering should be guided by conceptual reverse-
engineering. In Nietzsche’s image, one $rst needs to go 
backwards as everyone goes backwards who wants to 
take a big jump.
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